Top 5 Tax Considerations When Structuring Debt Investments in India - Resolut Partners

Top 5 Tax Considerations When Structuring Debt Investments in India

Key Takeaways

  • Recent developments in the Indian tax regime have brought India closer to global norms though hybrid instruments that have come under increased scrutiny
  • GAAR provisions have enabled tax authorities to examine the commercial substance of transactions, underscoring the importance of purpose, pooling, and people
  • Hybrid debt instruments face varied treatment under DTAAs vis-à-vis capital gains which may result in challenges when claiming treaty benefits
  • Beneficial ownership rules in DTAAs restrict treaty benefits to the entity exercising actual control over a return/income received
  • Is redemption premium interest income or capital gains? While DTAAs say interest, courts in India say capital gains. Conflicting classifications should not be a concern

Background

As distinctions between debt and equity are collapsing, investors may face challenges when interpreting applicable tax rules when investing into structured debt instruments. Different regimes have adopted varied approaches when classifying convertible instruments as either debt or equity. Tax authorities are increasingly resorting to the usage of GAAR to reclassify the nature of income based on an assessment of the underlying substance. Transfer pricing rules, beneficial ownership rules, and thin capitalization rules, implemented as tax-avoidance measures in recent years, have similarly disrupted conventional structuring efforts.

We examine these and other key tax considerations when structuring offshore debt investments into India including:

  1. GAAR and its implications on choice of jurisdiction and choice of instrument
  2. Treatment of convertible instruments under Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements (DTAAs)
  3. Multi-tiered structures being disregarded – implications of beneficial ownership?
  4. Transfer pricing and thin capitalization norms
  5. Redemption premium – capital gains or interest income?

1. GAAR and its implications on choice of jurisdiction and choice of instrument

As a starting point, investors must gauge where they are best placed to invest from, whether directly or through intermediate entities. Apart from regulatory and exchange control factors (which we have explored in detail elsewhere), relevant tax-based determinations when choosing a jurisdiction include:

a. the ability to demonstrate commercial substance in line with GAAR and DTAA provisions; and

b. the availability of DTAAs with India.

General Anti Avoidance Rules (GAAR) play the most important role in the choice of jurisdiction since they allow tax authorities to disallow tax benefits under DTAAs in certain cases.

GAAR provisions are triggered when an arrangement is regarded as an impermissible avoidance arrangement (IAA). An IAA is an arrangement entered into with the main purpose of obtaining a tax benefit.Where an arrangement is characterized as an IAA, tax authorities inter alia have the power to disallow DTAA benefits.

It is therefore important to demonstrate that the main purpose of investing in India through a particular jurisdiction is motivated by commercial reasons and not merely to obtain tax benefits. The Indian Income Tax Act, 1961 (ITA) provides that if an arrangement does not have any significant effect on net cash flows of the parties to the arrangement or the business risks, the arrangement will be deemed to lack ‘commercial substance’. The following factors are also relevant in practice when assessing the existence of commercial substance:

  1. Purpose. Apart from tax concerns, investors may choose a jurisdiction for a variety of reasons such as cultural proximity to India, a flexible legal regime and bilateral investment treaties. In a multi-level set up, this test should be applied on each entity in the structure. Where such alternative purpose can be demonstrated, tax authorities are more likely to view to the arrangement as permissible.
  2. Pooling. GAAR rules are more likely to be applied to holding companies as opposed to pooled investment funds. As offshore funds are likely to bring together investments from investors across various jurisdictions, this may serve as a defense against the application of rules.
  3. People. A strong case for commercial substance can be made out if there are people who manage and engage in business of the entity. These should be individuals who actively and exclusively engage in the work of the entity as opposed to management executives who are responsible for many different entities and exercise minimum executive engagement.

Commercial Substance in DTAAs

In cases where India and its treaty partner have ratified the ‘Multilateral Instrument’ (MLI), the requirement to demonstrate commercial substance is stricter. Under GAAR, it would be sufficient to simply demonstrate that a transaction’s ‘main purpose’ is not to gain a tax benefit. Under the modified MLI position, investors are required to show that none of the ‘principal purposes’ of the transaction/arrangement is to obtain a tax benefit, known as the ‘Principal Purpose Test’ (PPT).

If it can be reasonably concluded that even one of the principal purposes of a transaction/ arrangement was to obtain a tax benefit, tax authorities may disallow benefits available where the PPT is fulfilled, GAAR provisions should not be triggered. While the PPT is not applicable in all DTAAs, it has been incorporated in India’s DTAAs with Singapore, Netherlands, Ireland, the UK, and Luxembourg, amongst others.

Certain DTAAs, such as the India-Mauritius DTAA and the India-Singapore DTAA, prescribe a ‘Limitation of Benefits’ (LOB) clause. Per the LOB clause in the treaties, residents of a state are disentitled from treaty benefits (only with respect to capital gains) if their “affairs were arranged with the primary purpose of taking advantage of the benefits …” in the DTAA or if the entities are a “shell or conduit” entity2.

Tax Rates in DTAAs

We examine the tax treatment with respect to two primary sources of income in debt instruments: (a) gains/losses from sale of securities; and (b) interest income, in each such jurisdiction:

Jurisdiction Interest Tax Capital Gains Tax
Mauritius Withholding tax of 7.5%
Locally: Effective 3% (under the Partial Exemption Regime3).
Exempt
Singapore Withholding tax of 15%
Locally: 17% (though credit for 15% tax paid in India reduces the effective tax rate to only a further 2% in Singapore). Fund managers may also take exemptions where such 2% tax may also be exempt.4
Exempt
Luxembourg Withholding tax of 10% of the gross amount of interest. Exempt
Netherlands Withholding tax of 10% of gross amount of interest. Locally: ~ 25% (though credit for 10% tax paid in India is available). India can tax capital gains on all debt instruments if such gains arise on a sale of 10% or more securities to an Indian resident, and if such sale does not qualify as ‘restructuring’. All other cases, capital gains to be taxed in the Netherlands.

GAAR has also enabled tax authorities to examine the substance of the underlying transaction. As part of this power, tax authorities may disallow interest income and recharacterize it as dividend income if the relevant instrument is established to be in the nature of equity. Thus, it is critical to understand and structure instruments keeping in mind distinctions between debt and equity. While Indian jurisprudence has been limited in distinguishing between debt and equity for tax purposes, US jurisprudence provides some guidance via the Mixon Factors5 , summarized below.

  1. Certainty of Repayment. Do the parties expect that funds will be repaid in full with certainty, or is it dependent on profits or any other variable?
  2. Name vs Form. While the name of instrument is indicative, the ‘form’ of the instrument will be a definitive factor.
  3. Date of Repayment. The existence of a fixed date for repayment indicates a debt instrument.
  4. Source of Repayment. If repayment is sourced through liquidating assets, cash flow or refinancing, it will usually be characterised as debt. Typically, payments made through business profits (say, in the form of dividend) characterise equity.
  5. Rights of Enforcement. The existence of a right to enforce the payment of interest and/or capital.
  6. Management Participation. Typically, in debt investments, the investors do not get rights to participate in the management. However, non-significant management participation cannot be categorized as equity.
  7. Intent of Parties. The intention of the parties before and at the time of the transaction is a key factor. Courts may look at the books and records of the company, the usage of language in statutory and stock exchange filings, etc.
  8. Debt/Equity Ratios. If the company is thinly capitalised, the investment is likely to be categorised as equity rather than debt as the investor is likely to be exposed to the risks of an equity investor in such entities.
  9. Interest-Earning Relationship. If interest payments are expected regardless of future earnings, the investment is likely to be characterised as debt. Interest payments conditional on earnings and future profits is an equity inclined factor.
  10. Credit Risk. In case the investment termed as a loan is speculative in nature, it is likely to be categorised as equity rather than debt.
  11. Payment History. The history of payments made by the debtor is another factor which courts may use to analyse whether the parties intended the investment to be debt or equity

The above factors can be critical when demonstrating the nature of the instrument to tax authorities, especially where investors seek to claim the benefit of tax rates applicable as per DTAAs.

2. Treatment of Convertible Instruments in DTAAs

Investors must be mindful when structuring hybrid instruments such that features linked to the instrument do not result in an undesirable classification under DTAAs.

Several DTAAs, such as the India-Singapore DTAA and the India-Mauritius DTAA, provide different treatment for capital gains tax payable on ‘shares’ and for capital gains tax payable on ‘instruments other than shares’.

Under these DTAAs, capital gains tax payable on ‘instruments other than shares’ are taxed in the residence state i.e., in Singapore or Mauritius, where capital gains are exempt from taxation. On the other hand, capital gains on ‘shares’ are taxed in the source state i.e., if the issuer is in India, capital gains tax in India is applicable at a rate of 10%-20%.6

Thus, instrument-holders should question how their instruments will be classified: as a share or as an instrument other than a share?

What is a ‘share’ is not expressly apparent in the OECD Model Tax Convention nor in major DTAAs signed by India, including those with Singapore, Mauritius, and the Netherlands, since the term is undefined. Thus, this is a grey area in the law.

Judicial precedence on how tax treaties and their terms should be interpreted indicate that the conventional approach of interpreting tax statutes ‘strictly’ does not apply and that the ordinary meanings of words in DTAAs can be relied on.7 Thus, investors may take guidance from the definition of the terms ‘dividends’ and ‘interest’ which are typically seen to arise in the case of shares and debt respectively:

Dividends in major DTAAs are defined as income arising from “shares or other rights not being debt-claims, participating in profits ….” 8

The terms ‘debt-claim’ or ‘debt’ are similarly undefined in these DTAAs, and reference may be had to the definition of ‘interest’ therein:

“income from debt-claims of every kind, whether or not secured by mortgage and whether or not carrying a right to participate in the debtor‘s profits; and in particular, income from Government securities and income from bonds or debentures …” 9 [emphasis supplied].

Thus, to classify instruments as ‘shares’, the right to participate in the profits of the company can be seen as a critical factor. To this extent, instruments such as optionally convertible preference shares may be classified as ‘shares’ post-conversion since the instrument provides the holder a right to participate in profits of the company. In the case of ‘instruments other than shares’, debt, bonds, or debentures are indicative examples of what may be included.

Since ‘interest’ also includes income from instruments which provide a right to participate in profits of the company, instruments such as compulsorily and optionally convertible debentures may be classifiable as debt-claims i.e., ‘instruments other than shares’, though this is not expressly clear since they may also provide instrument holders.

Further complexities arise in the case of hybrid instruments such as mezzanine debt i.e., subordinated debt which converts into equity on the occurrence of certain events e.g., default. Mezzanine lenders are generally senior to pure equity holders but subordinate to senior lenders. Since mezzanine debt involves elements of a ‘debt-claim’ and a right to ‘participate in profits’, it is not expressly clear whether such instruments will fall into the definition of ‘shares’ (especially since the term is to be interpreted broadly as per judicial precedence discussed above). Similarly, in the case of securitized debt instruments, where underlying debt receivables are re-packaged into securities (usually through an intermediary entity), the character of the instrument is not expressly apparent.

Considering the above, when structuring specific rights into instruments, investors may find comfort in relying on the Mixon Factors discussed above.

3. Beneficial Ownership

When investing through entities or through other jurisdictions to reach India, investors should note that tax rates applicable under DTAAs are available only to the ‘beneficial owners’ of a return (being interest, dividend, royalty, or fees for technical services).

‘Beneficial ownership’ is a test commonly applied in tax treaties to identify the economic beneficiary in a particular transaction, i.e., the party entitled to use and enjoy the benefits which arise from a transaction. The term originates from the OECD Model Tax Convention which forms the basis for several DTAAs.10

The OECD’s Commentary on its Model Tax Convention states:

“Where the recipient of interest does have the right to use and enjoy the interest unconstrained by a contractual or legal obligation to pass on the payment received to another person, the recipient is the ‚beneficial owner‘ of that interest.”11

Simply put, the beneficial owner is the party which substantively receives the benefit or return in the transaction, such that treaty benefits on interest/dividends are generally available only to the beneficial owner (or at least to a greater extent). In the structured finance context, the beneficial owner is typically the recipient of interest payments though this may not necessarily be the immediate instrument-holder. However, there are certain exceptions to this rule: the OECD Model Tax Convention provides that in cases where an agent, nominee or conduit company acting as a fiduciary or administrator is the direct recipient of the interest, then such direct recipient will not be considered as the ‘beneficial owner’.

For example, an investor may consider investing through a Singaporean entity to claim a beneficial tax rate in Singapore vis-à-vis Cayman (see diagram above). Although the Singapore Co. is the instrument holder, it has a back-to-back arrangement with the Cayman Co., which has the actual right to decide what it wants to do with the interest income, thus the Cayman Co. may be considered as the beneficial owner. The Singapore Co. will not be able to claim the interest tax rate applicable under the India-Singapore DTAA.

Per the rule, agents, nominee or conduits are denied the benefit of the DTAA tax rate. This is because the direct recipient is under a contractual or legal obligation to pass on the payments received to another entity/person (the obligation may be substantively demonstrated where there is no express contractual obligation). This should not be confused with the concept of beneficial ownership used in other contexts which is usually demonstrated by ultimate control over entities or assets. Rather, the test assesses who has the right to use and enjoy the interest/dividend without any contractual/legal/ substantive obligation to transfer such payment onwards.

The concept has been aptly examined in the Indian case of M/s Golden Bella Holdings, involving an intra-group, convertible debt securities issuance12. Golden Bella Holdings (GBH), a Cyprus-based entity received funds from its Mauritius-based parent entity (M Co) to partially finance the acquisition of compulsorily convertible debentures (CCDs) issued by an Indian entity. The assessing tax officer (AO) in India held that GBH would have to pay the full domestic tax rate of 40% (as opposed to the beneficial interest tax rate of 10% under the India-Cyprus DTAA) on the interest income from the CCDs since GBH was not the beneficial owner of the income. The AO relied on the fact that the GBH was not the beneficial owner of the income. The AO relied on the fact that the assessee was a 100% subsidiary of M Co and that M Co’s funds were used to finance the acquisition. Thus, GBH was held to be a ‘conduit’ for M Co, and not the beneficial owner of the income.

In appeal, the Appellate Tribunal, when considering whether GBH could be considered as the beneficial owner of the interest income examined the following key considerations:

  1. exclusive possession and control over the interest income received;
  2. no requirement for the recipient to seek approval or obtain consent from another person for making investments; and
  3. absolute freedom for the recipient to utilize interest income received, unconstrained by any contractual, legal, or economic arrangements with any other third party

Since GBH fulfilled the above criteria, the Tribunal considered GBH to be the beneficial owner of the interest. The Tribunal noted that GBH was not a conduit company – it possessed a tax residency certificate and was undertaking business activities of its own accord. The partial financing of CCDs by a shareholder would also not affect GBH’s status as the beneficial owner of the interest income.

The following are some structural considerations when demonstrating beneficial ownership:

  1. Tax Residency Certificate. A tax residency certificate is the first step towards demonstrating beneficial ownership. In HSBC Bank (Mauritius), the Tribunal relied on a circular issued by the CBDT to hold that tax residency certificates can be used to demonstrate where beneficial ownership lies.13 Though the circular was issued in the context of the India-Mauritius DTAA, its application has been judicially extended to other treaties, such as to the India-Netherlands DTAA in the case of Universal International.14
  2. Agreement to transfer and burden of proof. The recipient of interest income is presumed to be the beneficial owner of interest income unless there is an agreement/ document recording an obligation to transfer the interest income received. 15
  3. Group Structure of the Entity. Courts will take into account the overall group structure, though this may not be determinative). For example, in Bharti Airtel,16 the Tribunal relied on the fact that the direct recipient of the income was a significant branch of the main bank which was actually a resident of Netherlands. In Prévost Car, the Canadian Court examined the income recipient’s incorporation documents to determine whether there was an obligation to upstream dividends (there was no such obligation).17
  4. Substantive Business Activities. The recipient of the income should be substantively undertaking its own business activities. The Korean Supreme Court in Citibank Korea Co. Ltd. held that the content, business activities and actual use of income are relevant determinations18. The Court looked favourably upon the income recipient undertaking its own investment decisions, substantial economic activities and exercising ownership rights over the income.

What are some practical challenges and mitigants which investors should be aware of?

  1. Distributions to investors. Companies may be required to distribute returns to investors. In such cases, it is important for such companies to demonstrate that returns to investors are being remitted at the discretion of the holding company, and not via a legal obligation to distribute earnings, though this may be challenging since in most cases investors will prefer to have their returns provided for under contract. In Prévost Car, even though shareholders upstreamed nearly 80% of the company’s income to shareholders, this was not viewed adversely since there was no obligation to do so, thus, the direct recipient of the income was held to be the beneficial owner.
  2. Common management. Management personnel may be common across multiple entities. In such cases, care should be taken such that the personnel in parent entities are not deciding/controlling how income should be used in intermediary/subsidiary entities where they are also working. Though this may be challenging to demonstrate, mitigants can include Chinese walls or an ability to display independent decisionmaking with recorded reasoning.
  3. Shareholder loans or capital raises. In some cases, subsidiary/intermediary entities may rely on holding companies to provide funds e.g., through shareholder loans, to make their own investments. In such cases, the intermediary entity should be able to demonstrate that they decide how to use the income from such investments. This should be permissible since approaching parent companies to raise funds is a natural form of financing (see Golden Bella Holdings above), though this may be challenging where shareholder loan terms place certain use or return covenants. 

How can investors demonstrate control over income received?

  1. Spread over income received. When under an obligation to repay/provide returns to investors used to finance acquisition debt instruments, investors may consider remitting/upstreaming only a portion of the interest income from its investments and using the remaining income for other purposes. By ‘spreading’ the interest income received, intermediary entities may be more likely toto demonstrate control over the income they receive.
  2. Commercial substance. In addition to its importance for GAAR and PPT (discussed above), commercial substance plays a crucial role in demonstrating that an entity was not set up with the intention of taking advantage of treaty tax rates. Substance can be demonstrated through income which is attributable to significant business activities which are unique to the entity, through employees whose efforts are largely directed towards that entity, and other similar demonstrable commercial considerations.
  3. Independent decision making. Investors may demonstrate control over income received through documentation e.g., minutes of meetings of the board of directors, which record the board’s independent decision-making over income received.

4. Transfer Pricing and Thin Capitalization

Investors should be wary of transfer pricing (TP) provisions – an enabling mechanism under Indian law to ensure that related parties in international transactions deal with each other on an arm’s length basis i.e., as if the parties were independent and unrelated. TP provisions apply to ‘international transactions’ between ‘associated enterprises’.19 The following elements must be present in a transaction to be identified as an ‘international transaction’: (a) two or more associated enterprises (where either one or both the parties are non-residents); and (b) an effect on the profit, income, loss, or assets of the enterprises involved and includes purchases, sales, leases, etc.20

‘Associated enterprises’ exist where one enterprise is directly or indirectly involved in the management or control of the other enterprise, or if there is common management or control between the two enterprises. Enterprises which are deemed to be ‘associated enterprises’ include (amongst others), (a) shareholders with more than 26% voting power, (b) enterprises who have advanced loans having a value greater than 50% of the other recipient’s assets, or (c) enterprises having the power to nominate majority of the board on other enterprises, etc.21

In context of debt, thin capitalisation rules become important inasmuch as they limit the interest deduction on borrowings from associated enterprises (as defined above). The rules aim to prevent investors transferring debt to related entities in tax friendly jurisdictions in order to maximize interest deductions and erode the borrower’s Indian tax base. Thus, the rules provide that any interest expenses/similar expenditures payable by the borrower (in excess of INR 1 crores) to associated enterprise lenders which are in excess of: 30% of the borrower’s EBIDTA in the previous year; or the interest paid/payable by the borrower to associated enterprises in the previous year, whichever is less, will be disallowed (i.e., the excess cannot be claimed as a deduction)22. Disallowed interest expenses can however be ‘carried forward’ i.e., the excess interest expenses may still deductible in the 8 assessment years following the year in which the interest expenditure was first computed. Investors who are looking to infuse debt into group entities in India should therefore account for the present value of interest which can be disallowed and the interest which can be carried forward and set off against future profits as per the rules, when computing returns on investments. Borrowers in highly leveraged sectors such as real estate and infrastructure face a greater disallowance risk, especially when relying on significant amounts of intragroup debt. Borrowers in these sectors may consider: (a) restricting the extent of intra-group loans to the threshold prescribed in the rules (taking into account the carry forward allowances); (b) taking on a greater proportion debt from non-related parties, (c) ensuring that lenders do not hold significant governance rights which could classify the lender as an ‘associated enterprise’.

Borrowers may also consider that the disallowance under the rules is only applicable to interest payments on ‘debt’.23 As a consequence, payments which are classifiable as royalties or fees for technical services may not be included within the scope of ‘debt’.

Disallowance Risk for Early-Stage Development Projects

The 30% – EBITDA threshold in thin capitalization rules may be challenging for early-stage development projects where there are little to no earnings early-on, though interest payments may still be required if no moratorium has been provided to borrowers. Such borrowers are more likely to cross the threshold, especially when required to pay in excess of 30% interest per year and may consider the mitigants discussed above

5. Redemption Premium on Debt Instruments – Interest or Capital Gains?

Where a premium is payable on redemption of debt instruments, it may appear to be in the nature of an interest earning and therefore liable to interest income tax. However, where a debt instrument is held as a capital asset, any income on its redemption could invite capital gains tax if the redemption premium is considered to arise from the ‘alienation’ of a capital asset (for DTAA purposes) or the ‘extinguishment’ of the capital asset (for ITA purposes). From a treaty standpoint, it is tax optimal, in many cases, to classify this premium as capital gains, which are tax exempt in several jurisdictions including Singapore and Mauritius.

Whether redemption premium is to be taxed as ‘interest’ or as ‘capital gains’ rests squarely on the meaning and interpretation of the terms.

Interest in the ITA has been defined to mean “interest payable in any manner in respect of any moneys borrowed or debt incurred and includes any service fee or charge in respect of moneys borrowed.” 24

Section 45 of the ITA provides that profits or gains arising from the ‘transfer’ of a capital asset25 is subject to capital gains tax. “Transfer” as defined in Section 2(47) the ITA and includes, inter alia, “….the sale, exchange or relinquishment of the asset; or … the extinguishment of any rights therein…”26. Courts have previously held that a specific income can fall only under one head of income27, thus redemption premium will not be subject to both capital gains tax and interest income tax simultaneously

In Mrs. Perviz Wang Chuk Basi28, the Tribunal supported the view that redemption of debt instruments (bonds in this case) would be considered as “extinguishment” of the capital asset:

“Extinguishment of right in an asset would mean the end of right in the asset either by operation of law or by contractual agreement. When capital bonds are redeemed, then after the date of redemption, they do not remain bonds but certainly what remains is an asset with the assessee. It cannot be denied that there was a right in the asset with the assessee, which was later encashed by the by surrender to the competent authority and receiving cash thereon. Thus, after the date of redemption, there was an extinguishment of right by operation of contract and also a relinquishment of right in the asset in lieu of which, the assessee received cash from the competent authority. In either of the situations, the case is covered within the definition of Section 2(47)” [emphasis supplied].

In making its decision, the Tribunal relied on precedent which clarified that ‘extinguishment’ in Section 2(47) includes extinguishment of any right, such that even if the underlying instrument is still in existence, extinguishment of one right in the instrument would be considered as a ‘transfer’ resulting in a ‘capital gain’ (the case in reference involved partial reduction in the face value the shares).29

A similar approach was adopted in Seth Gwaldas Mathuradas Mohata30 in the context of premium on redemption of preference shares wherein the Bombay High Court held:

“The assessee by virtue of his being a holder of redeemable cumulative preference shares had a right in the profits of the company, if and when made, at a fixed rate of percentage. Quite obviously, this was a valuable right and this right had come to an end by company‘s redemption of shares. Thus, the transaction also amounted to ‘extinguishment‘ of right. Under the circumstances, viewed from any angle, there is no escape from the conclusion that section 2(47) was attracted…”

Therefore, under Indian law, gains realized on the redemption of the debt instruments at the time of maturity or the sale of the debt instruments before the completion of the maturity period are likely to be characterized as capital gains in India.

However, most DTAAs (including the India-Singapore, India-Luxembourg, IndiaMauritius DTAAs) include redemption premium within the definition of ‘interest’, and therefore subject to withholding tax in India at applicable rates, in addition to any taxes that may be payable in the resident state.

For instance, article 11 (3) of the India-Singapore DTAA defines ‘interest’ as:

“The term „interest“ as used in this Article means income from debt-claims of every kind, whether or not secured by mortgage and whether or not carrying a right to participate in the debtor‘s profits; and in particular, income from Government securities and income from bonds or debentures, including premiums and prizes attaching to such securities, bonds or debentures.” [emphasis supplied]

There is however scope for uncertainty in some DTAAs, such as the India-Mauritius DTAA, which may also include redemption premium within the scope of capital gains. Article 13 of the India-Mauritius DTAA provides for the taxation of capital gains arising on the “alienation” of instruments. Paragraph 5 of Article 13 defines ‘alienation’ to include “extinguishment of any rights therein”:

“For the purposes of this article, the term „alienation“ means the sale, exchange, transfer, or relinquishment of the property or the extinguishment of any rights therein or the compulsory acquisition thereof under any law in force in the respective Contracting States”.

The issue has been examined in the case of In re. XYZ/ABC Equity Fund31, where the Authority for Advance Rulings (AAR) has held, in the context of income from investments made in India by a collective investment vehicle resident for tax purposes in Mauritius, that income such as premium from redemption of debentures should be treated as capital gains, where the assessee has not been carrying on the business of lending money, and should therefore fall within the ambit of Article 13 of the IndiaMauritius DTAA.

Notably, the definition of “alienation” as above is not expressly stated in all DTAAs, thus the above judicial interpretation may not be simply imported into the context of such other DTAAs which India has entered into. In these cases, redemption premium is more likely to be classified as ‘interest’.

The classification in DTAAs vis-à-vis the ITA should not impact offshore investors, i.e., there should not be a situation where an offshore investor is liable to pay both capital gains tax in India and interest tax on the redemption premium as per the DTAAs. This is because it is an accepted principle that the main purpose of Section 90 of the ITA and the applicable DTAAs is to grant relief and not to impose any additional fresh liability that is not provided under the ITA32; and therefore, the provisions of the ITA should supersede the provisions under the DTAA to the extent that they are more beneficial to the assessee.

When assessing the tax payable on redemption premium, the taxpayer should undertake an assessment under both the ITA and the DTAA, separately, in order to determine which head will apply. Even if the applicable heads are different under the ITA and the DTAA (e.g., if redemption premium is classified as capital gains under the ITA and interest under the relevant DTAA), the taxpayer should be entitled to avail of the more beneficial tax treatment. Though some tribunals have since taken a view that the preferred approach would be to assess the applicable head under the DTAA and then compare tax rates applicable under that head in the ITA and DTAA respectively, this approach may not necessarily be seen to be in consonance with the approach to Section 90 of the ITA.

Can borrowers still claim redemption premium as a deductible expense?

Even though redemption premium is likely to be classified as ‘capital gains’ in the hands of the investor/instrument-holder under the ITA, redemption premium may still be classifiable as an ‘interest expense’ for a borrower, with differing treatments existing for borrowers and investors.

Section 37 of the ITA permits deductions for expenditures which are not in the nature of a capital expenditure and which are exclusively for the purposes of business or profession33. Various judgements, such as Raymond Ltd., have clarified that payment of premium on redemption is a revenue expense.34 In Raymond, the Bombay High Court held that the since redemption premium was a liability incurred by the assessee to obtain use of the funds for the purposes of its business, it would be classified as a revenue expenditure.

Courts have clarified that the character of the expense in the hands of the borrower may not necessarily determine the character of the income in the hands of the investor. In Madras Industrial,35, the Court held that: “… the character of payment in relation to the payer can be different from the character of that payment in the hands of the recipient.” Thus, assessments of the character of redemption premium should be made considering who the taxpayer is.

1 The MLI is a multilateral tax treaty entered into between countries to set out minimum standards and a framework for amending DTAAs to curb tax avoidance and treaty abuse. Where the MLI has been ratified by two contracting states, their DTAA is required to be modified as per the minimum standards set out therein. Article 7 of the MLI and the Action 6 Report which requires countries to implement at least one of the following anti-abuse measures in their treaties – (i) a principal purpose test (“PPT”) only, which is a general anti-abuse rule based on the principal purpose of transactions or arrangements (ii) a PPT supplemented with either a simplified or a detailed limitation on benefits (“LOB”) provision, or (iii) a detailed LOB provision, supplemented by a mutually negotiated mechanism to deal with conduit arrangements not already dealt with in tax treaties.

2 See Part (b) of Annexure A for the definition of a ‘shell or conduit’ entity under the India-Singapore DTAA.

3 Partial exemption is available to a company subject to the following conditions:
a. It must carry out its core income generating activities in Mauritius;
b. It must employ directly or indirectly, an adequate number of suitably qualified persons to conduct its core income generating activities; and
c. It must incur a minimum expenditure proportionate to its level of activities.

4 Singapore tax authorities have introduced key exemptions for funds set up in Singapore and managed by a Singapore-based manager (and which are thus liable to be taxed in Singapore) where subject to certain conditions (and a min. S$200,000 in expenses) entire income of the Singapore fund could be tax exempt.

5 Estate of Mixon v. United States, 464 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1972).

6 Per Article 13 of the India-Singapore DTAA, “Gains from the alienation of shares acquired on or after 1 April 2017 in a company which is a resident of a Contracting State may be taxed in that State,” while “Gains from the alienation of any property other than that referred to in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4A and 4B of this Article shall be taxable only in the Contracting State of which the alienator is a resident”.

7 In Linklaters LLP v. ITO, it was held that: „… To find the meaning of words employed in the tax treaties, we have to primarily look at the ordinary meanings given to those words in that context and in the light of its objects and purpose…” [2010] 40 SOT 51 (Mum.). See also: Dy. CIT v. Boston Consulting Group Pte. Ltd. [2005] 94 ITD 31 (Mum.); New Skies Satellites N.V. v. Asstt. DIT (International Taxation) [2009] 121 ITD 1 (Delhi) (SB); Ensco Maritime Ltd. v. Dy. CIT [2004] 91 ITD 459 (Delhi).

8 Article 10, India-Singapore DTAA.

9 Article 11, India-Singapore DTAA

10 The term is also used in the UN Model Tax Treaty

11 Para 10.2 of the OECD Commentary (2017) on Article 11 (Interest) of the ‚Model Tax Convention‘

12 M/s Golden Bella Holdings vs Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, ITA No. 6958/Mum/2017.

13 In HSBC Bank (Mauritius) Limited [TS-460-ITAT-2018(Mum)], the ITAT relied on the Circular 789 of 2000 issued by the CBDT as evidence that tax residency certificates should be considered as proof of beneficial ownership. The Tribunal noted that though the circular was in the context of dividends and capital gains, it could be applied here since there was a need to prove beneficial ownership; See also:

14 DIT vs Universal International Music B.V, [2013] 31 taxman.com 223 wherein a tax residency certificate was relied on by the Tribunal to demonstrate beneficial ownership over royalty income received.

15 Hyundai Motor India Ltd. vs DCIT [2017] 81 taxmann.com 5.

16 In the case of Bharti Airtel Limited [TS-141-ITAT-2014(DEL)], the ITAT held that interest paid by Airtel to ABN Amro Bank’s Sweden Branch would not mean that ABN Amro Sweden is the beneficial owner since it was only a conduit for ABN Amro Bank Netherlands which was the original lender. Moreover, ABN Amro Bank was actually a tax resident of the Netherlands. Thus, it was the ABN Netherlands which was the beneficial owner.

17 Prévost Car Inc. v. The Queen, Federal Court of Appeal, Canada, 2008 TCC 231.

18 [TS-757-FC-2020(KOR)].

19 Please refer to Annexure B for the OECD guidance on arm’s lengths transactions.

20 Per Section 92B of the ITA, similar transactions include purchase, sale or lease of tangible or intangible assets, provision of services, borrowing or lending of money.

21 Please refer to Part (a) of Annexure A for the definition of ‘associated enterprises’ provided in the ITA.

22 The rule will also apply to interest paid to third-party lenders if an associated enterprise provides an implicit or explicit guarantee to the lender or if it deposits a corresponding amount of funds with the lender..

23 Per Section 94B(5), ITA, ‘debt’ in the context of thin capitalisation rules has been defined as „any loan, financial instrument, finance lease, financial derivative, or any arrangement that gives rise to interest, discounts or other finance charges that are deductible in the computation of income chargeable under the head „Profits and gains of business or profession.“

24 As per Section 2(28A) of the ITA, “interest” means “interest payable in any manner in respect of any moneys borrowed or debt incurred (including a deposit, claim or other similar right or obligation) and includes any service fee or charge in respect of moneys borrowed or debt incurred or in respect of any credit facility which has not been utilized”.

25 Section 2(14) of the ITA provides that the definition of capital asset includes “property of any kind” and “property” has been defined as „property“ is deemed to include “any rights in or in relation to an Indian company”. Thus, debt instruments will be classified as capital assets.

26 Section 2(47) of the ITA.

27 Clifford Chance v. Deputy CIT, 2002 82 ITD 106 Mum.

28 Mrs. Perviz Wang Chuk Basi v. Joint Commissioner of Income-tax, Spl. Range 7, [2006] 102 ITD 123 (Mum).

29 Kartikeya v. Sarabhai v. CIT [1997] 228 ITR 163.

30 [1987] 165 ITR 620 Bom.

31 [2001] 250 ITR 194.

32 ACIT v. Clough Engineering Ltd (2011) 9 ITR (Trib.) 618.

33 Section 37 of the ITA states as follows: “Any expenditure (not being expenditure of the nature described in sections 30 to 36 and not being in the nature of capital expenditure or personal expenses of the assessee), laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the business or profession shall be allowed in computing the income chargeable under the head “Profits and gains of business or profession.”

34 CIT v. Raymond Ltd., [2012] 209 Taxman 65 (Bombay). See also: CIT v. First Leasing Company of India Ltd., [2007] 292 ITR 110 (Mad); CIT v. Shree Rajasthan Syntex Ltd., [2004] 269 ITR 461 (Raj); Madras Industrial Investment Corporation v. CIT, [1997] 225 ITR 802 (SC).

35 Madras Industrial Investment Corporation v. CIT, [1997] 225 ITR 802 (SC),

Private Funds and Asset Management

Analysis

Private Funds: SEBI introduces investor diligence requirements for AIFs

Private Funds: SEBI introduces investor diligence requirements for AIFs

  • SEBI has cast new investor diligence obligations on AIF managers, which extends to underlying investors
  • As per the new rule, the manager of an AIF is not permitted to on-board new investors or draw down capital from existing investors unless the diligence conditions have been complied with…
How to Negotiate Key Person Provisions – A Lawyer’s Guide

How to Negotiate Key Person Provisions – A Lawyer’s Guide

  • The occurrence of a key person event should not trigger a domino effect across other funds managed by the sponsor
  • The ‘time and attention’ requirement should be drafted so as to avoid inadvertent foot faults
  • The question of whether or not a key person event has occurred should not be the subject of a long-drawn determination process…
What’s Holding Back Indian Fund Managers From Raising Global Capital?

What’s Holding Back Indian Fund Managers From Raising Global Capital?

  • Indian fund managers, thus far restricted, may now be able to setup India-focussed offshore funds
  • Is investment by resident individuals in offshore funds now restricted, even under LRS? Not quite – we address the ambiguity
  • Will GIFT now emerge as the most favoured jurisdiction for setup of India-focussed funds?…
GP-Led Secondaries in India – Considerations and Challenges

GP-Led Secondaries in India – Considerations and Challenges

  • GP-led secondaries have become fairly popular globally given that they solve for the liquidity concerns among some LPs whilst allowing the GP to capture more upside from an investment.

  • In a GP- led secondary deal, it is important to find a pricing that works for the exiting investors but keeps the acquisition attractive for the incoming investors…
Private Funds: Corpus v Investible Funds – Need to reconsider SEBI’s penalty order?

Private Funds: Corpus v Investible Funds – Need to reconsider SEBI’s penalty order?

  • SEBI has strictly construed the term ‘investible funds’ leaving no scope for commercial nuances.
  • SEBI rules that estimated expenditure cannot be offset against estimated income streams when calculating investible funds.
  • SEBI appears to be driven by the view that investors should not be over-concentrated in a single asset…
Private Funds: SEBI holds AIF investors in breach of insider trading norms for AIF’s investments decisions

Private Funds: SEBI holds AIF investors in breach of insider trading norms for AIF’s investments decisions

  • SEBI holds investors of AIFs having UPSI/ MNPI in breach of insider trading norms for investment decisions of AIFs
  • Investors into pooled investment vehicles exposed to substantial risk for actions beyond their control and visibility
  • Compliance seems rather impractical and creates complications for both the AIF and its investors – bad law that needs to studied for its potential implications…
Private Funds: Six considerations when negotiating carry clawback provisions

Private Funds: Six considerations when negotiating carry clawback provisions

  • Clawback liability must be ascertained with respect to each investor
  • Standalone clawback obligations may not be sufficient
  • The clawback provision should include a true-up mechanism for sponsors…
GIFT City – Analysing New Fund Management Regulations and why GIFT City still doesn’t work

GIFT City – Analysing New Fund Management Regulations and why GIFT City still doesn’t work

  • IFSCA proposes significant shift in regulatory regime for investments funds – shift from investment vehicle towards fund management entity (FME)
  • Replacement of Category I, II and III AIFs under present AIF Framework with investment
    schemes viz. Venture Capital Scheme, Restricted Scheme (Non-Retail) and Retail Schemes…
SEBI formalises the use of co-investments but leaves some question marks?

SEBI formalises the use of co-investments but leaves some question marks?

  • SEBI introduces a new co-investment framework permitting AIF investors to co-invest alongside the AIF through portfolio managers
  • The new framework provides that co-investments cannot be on more favourable
    terms than AIF investments

  • Co-investments are not permitted in listed securities…

Research Paper

Fund Formation: The Beginning of the Fund Lifecycle for India Focussed Funds

Fund Formation: The Beginning of the Fund Lifecycle for India Focussed Funds

We are delighted to share our most recent and comprehensive research paper discussing at length the legal, tax, regulatory, commercial and strategic issues concerning the setting up of India focussed funds. Over the past few years, the investment funds industry has been the subject of a series of legislative and regulatory interventions designed variously to protect investor interests as well as to enlarge the scope of investment activity. From an Indian fund formation perspective, this is evidenced from the introduction of codes of conduct for various stakeholders,…

Public Equity

Analysis

Public M&A: New Delisting Norms – What is the Excitement Really About?

Public M&A: New Delisting Norms – What is the Excitement Really About?

  • SEBI’s Consultation Paper proposes a comprehensive review of counter-offer mechanism, counter-offer price discovery mechanism, fixed price mechanism, floor price and reference date
  • Fixed price delisting, largely regarded as a welcome move, fails to excite us and appears lackluster against the present reverse book building mechanism due to absence of a counter-offer mechanism
Public M&A: Are Warrants attractive price protection instruments?

Public M&A: Are Warrants attractive price protection instruments?

  • Recent SEBI informal guidance to Paramount clarifies ambiguity on holding periods for warrants
  • Though warrants could be listed, listed warrants are almost non-existent
  • Unlisted warrants cannot be transferred (no matter how long they’ve been held for)
  • Shares received upon conversion of warrants are locked-in for 6 months, but unlike
    other convertibles, the…

SEBI’s Proposed Disclosure Regime: Impact on Public M&A and Directors’ Liabilities

SEBI’s Proposed Disclosure Regime: Impact on Public M&A and Directors’ Liabilities

  • Most proposals are well thought through – unintended impact in a few cases
  • Mandatory clarification of media rumours – M&A dealmaking compromised and potential creation of a false market?…
Unexplored Strategies in the Fortis Saga: Public shareholders and IHH Healthcare exposed to significant collateral damage?

Unexplored Strategies in the Fortis Saga: Public shareholders and IHH Healthcare exposed to significant collateral damage?

  • Latest SC judgement uncovers Daiichi’s new approach – Fortis, IHH and, public shareholders under the gun for liabilities of Fortis’ erstwhile promoters
  • Public shareholders will need to brace for impact and be proactive – else risk getting the short end of the stick
  • Legal sanctity of the ‘theory of attribution’ possibly misplaced in the Fortis context…
SEBI orders public disclosure at M&A negotiation stage: Compromises deal certainty and amplifies directors’ liabilities

SEBI orders public disclosure at M&A negotiation stage: Compromises deal certainty and amplifies directors’ liabilities

  • Listed companies forced to publicly disclose deal details pending finalization of negotiations
  • Investors bereft of price and deal certainty, may even face reputational damage
  • Directors of listed companies may be liable for market manipulation and exposed to litigation if they publicly disclose a deal which then falls through…
Decoding Boardroom Dilemmas (Part III): Can Nominee Directors Share UPSI with Nominating Shareholders?

Decoding Boardroom Dilemmas (Part III): Can Nominee Directors Share UPSI with Nominating Shareholders?

  • No express framework exists for nominee directors to share UPSI with nominating shareholders
  • Natural expectation that nominee directors should represent their nominators’ interests – not permitted under law
  • Since nominee directors’ fiduciary duty remains towards the company and stakeholders, nominee directors are paradoxically placed and exposed to significant…
Decoding Boardroom Dilemmas – Hiving Off to Fundraise Through Subsidiaries – Commercial Wisdom or Short-Changing Public Shareholders?

Decoding Boardroom Dilemmas – Hiving Off to Fundraise Through Subsidiaries – Commercial Wisdom or Short-Changing Public Shareholders?

  • Transferring a majority-revenue generating business into a private subsidiary (hiving off) and raising funds at the subsidiary level is increasingly seen as a preferred alternative to direct listed acquisitions or slump sales
  • Hiving off may result in a ‘holding company discount’ and public shareholders lose out on value…
Private Funds: SEBI holds AIF investors in breach of insider trading norms for AIF’s investments decisions

Private Funds: SEBI holds AIF investors in breach of insider trading norms for AIF’s investments decisions

  • SEBI holds investors of AIFs having UPSI/ MNPI in breach of insider trading norms for investment decisions of AIFs
  • Investors into pooled investment vehicles exposed to substantial risk for actions beyond their control and visibility
  • Compliance seems rather impractical and creates complications for both the AIF and its investors – bad law that needs to studied for its potential implications…

Private Equity/ M&A

Analysis

SEBI is slowly re-defining InvITs: What’s at risk for the product and its institutional audience?

SEBI is slowly re-defining InvITs: What’s at risk for the product and its institutional audience?

  • Strong minority unitholder protections introduced – for both public and private InvITs
  • Private InvITs originally designed to attract large institutional capital – light touch re- gulations allowed flexibility to parties to manage their arrangements…
Investing into Infrastructure Holding Companies: What if you become a core investment company?

Investing into Infrastructure Holding Companies: What if you become a core investment company?

  • Infrastructure companies are mandated to execute concessions through SPVs, which often results in qualification of the holding company as a core investment company (CIC)
  • CIC risk is often avoided by structuring EPC and O&M revenues through the hol- ding company and swelling …
Blurring lines between FPI and FDI: Can foreign investors really acquire less than 10% listed stake off market?

Blurring lines between FPI and FDI: Can foreign investors really acquire less than 10% listed stake off market?

  • Investors face roadblocks in picking up less than 10% listed stake off the market under the FDI route
  • The shift from an investor-centric to investment-centric regime has been rather mismanaged, leading to divergent market practices…
EduInfra  – Emergence of a new asset class

EduInfra – Emergence of a new asset class

  • EduInfra offers a promising 10 – 11% entry cap rate for annuity investors with rental escalations in the region of 3
    – 5%

  • Infrastructure classification allows for tax optimal exit through InvITs
  • Seller awareness needed – operators slowly moving towards asset light models; depth, but potential…
Investor or developer? Real estate regulator (RERA) classifies real estate fund as a promoter

Investor or developer? Real estate regulator (RERA) classifies real estate fund as a promoter

  • The term ‘causes to construct’ in the definition of ‘promoter’ under RERA has been interpreted to include private funds exercising rights typical to such investments

  • Protective rights of investors have been interpreted as being secondary to the rights of the homebuyers – in a conflict, the latter should be protected, notwithstanding inter-se contractual relationship between developer and fund…
Revamped Overseas Investment Regime (Part I) – A Rational Overhaul

Revamped Overseas Investment Regime (Part I) – A Rational Overhaul

  • Round tripping no longer illegitimate – doors open for externalisation and de-SPAC transactions
  • Definitional clarity on direct investments and portfolio investments
  • Indian GPs get a glidepath to setup offshore pooling structures…

Private Credit / Structured Finance

Analysis

C&I Green Open Access-play: The next big investment destination for infra funds?

C&I Green Open Access-play: The next big investment destination for infra funds?

  • C&I market significantly untapped – accounts for just 6% of the total renewable power purchases
  • Captive open access the most preferred route – i.e. procuring power for captive consumption from private renewable players using govt. transmission facilities.
  • C&I consumer perspective – low investment, significant cost savings,
Smart meters: The basic infrastructure for a green future

Smart meters: The basic infrastructure for a green future

  • Smart meters are essentially a data play – offering unprecedented data that can be used to bring online more green energy, curb electricity loses and reduce costs for consumers
  • The sector has immense depth – USD 30 bn over just the next 2-3 years….
SEBI is slowly re-defining InvITs: What’s at risk for the product and its institutional audience?

SEBI is slowly re-defining InvITs: What’s at risk for the product and its institutional audience?

  • Strong minority unitholder protections introduced – for both public and private InvITs
  • Private InvITs originally designed to attract large institutional capital – light touch re- gulations allowed flexibility to parties to manage their arrangements…
Revamped Overseas Investment Regime (Part II) – Overseas Debt Investments Rationalized

Revamped Overseas Investment Regime (Part II) – Overseas Debt Investments Rationalized

  • Control threshold introduced for offshore debt – a shift of focus towards strategic growth
  • Offshore private credit and special situation funding now permitted
  • Debenture trustee’s introduced to encourage offshore funding to an Indian entity…
Private Credit: Supreme Court holds that ownership of pledged shares remains with pledgor despite transfer to pledgee 

Private Credit: Supreme Court holds that ownership of pledged shares remains with pledgor despite transfer to pledgee 

  • SC overrules a series of prior rulings which held that pledgee becomes the owner of pledged shares upon invocation.
  • SC holds that even though pledgee is recorded as beneficial owner upon invocation, pledgee only receives ‘special rights’ and not ‘ownership’ over pledged shares.
  • The term ‘actual sale’ means sale to a third party…
Threat of valuation litigation in Public M&A – Carlyle-PNB Effect! 

Threat of valuation litigation in Public M&A – Carlyle-PNB Effect! 

  • SEBI floor price prescription in case of fund raises should not automatically dislodge directors’ duty to exercise independent judgment and maximise shareholder value
  • Target boards to proactively consider appointing an independent banker and running a robust auction process for capital raises…
SEBI Introduces Special Situation Funds: Opens doors for acquisition of stressed loans without ARC intermediation

SEBI Introduces Special Situation Funds: Opens doors for acquisition of stressed loans without ARC intermediation

  • Special Situation Funds (SSF) have been launched Category – 1 AIF for sophisticated investors
  • Offshore investors no longer have to rely on an Asset Reconstruction Company /
    Asset Reconstruction Trust framework to invest in stressed assets…

Research Paper

C&I Green Open Access-play: The next big investment destination for infra funds?

C&I Green Open Access-play: The next big investment destination for infra funds?

  • C&I market significantly untapped – accounts for just 6% of the total renewable power purchases
  • Captive open access the most preferred route – i.e. procuring power for captive consumption from private renewable players using govt. transmission facilities.
  • C&I consumer perspective – low investment, significant cost savings,
Smart meters: The basic infrastructure for a green future

Smart meters: The basic infrastructure for a green future

  • Smart meters are essentially a data play – offering unprecedented data that can be used to bring online more green energy, curb electricity loses and reduce costs for consumers
  • The sector has immense depth – USD 30 bn over just the next 2-3 years….
SEBI is slowly re-defining InvITs: What’s at risk for the product and its institutional audience?

SEBI is slowly re-defining InvITs: What’s at risk for the product and its institutional audience?

  • Strong minority unitholder protections introduced – for both public and private InvITs
  • Private InvITs originally designed to attract large institutional capital – light touch re- gulations allowed flexibility to parties to manage their arrangements…
Structures and Considerations for Offshore Debt Funding

Structures and Considerations for Offshore Debt Funding

Special situations and private credit funds have been increasingly looking at the high yield Indian market. With banks facing liquidity and risk issues, alternate capital with customised solutions seem attractive. Structured commonly through collateralised redeemable bonds with pay-outs deferred until maturity, these bonds may have equity kickers built-in as well, in the form of redemption premium linked to any variable, such as underlying equity share price or cashflows. While offshore capital is interested, currency, tax withholdings, enforceability and regulatory risks dampen the return profile on a risk-adjusted dollar return basis…

Infrastructure Investment Trusts

Analysis

C&I Green Open Access-play: The next big investment destination for infra funds?

C&I Green Open Access-play: The next big investment destination for infra funds?

  • C&I market significantly untapped – accounts for just 6% of the total renewable power purchases
  • Captive open access the most preferred route – i.e. procuring power for captive consumption from private renewable players using govt. transmission facilities.
  • C&I consumer perspective – low investment, significant cost savings,
Smart meters: The basic infrastructure for a green future

Smart meters: The basic infrastructure for a green future

  • Smart meters are essentially a data play – offering unprecedented data that can be used to bring online more green energy, curb electricity loses and reduce costs for consumers
  • The sector has immense depth – USD 30 bn over just the next 2-3 years….
SEBI is slowly re-defining InvITs: What’s at risk for the product and its institutional audience?

SEBI is slowly re-defining InvITs: What’s at risk for the product and its institutional audience?

  • Strong minority unitholder protections introduced – for both public and private InvITs
  • Private InvITs originally designed to attract large institutional capital – light touch re- gulations allowed flexibility to parties to manage their arrangements…
Investing into Infrastructure Holding Companies: What if you become a core investment company?

Investing into Infrastructure Holding Companies: What if you become a core investment company?

  • Infrastructure companies are mandated to execute concessions through SPVs, which often results in qualification of the holding company as a core investment company (CIC)
  • CIC risk is often avoided by structuring EPC and O&M revenues through the hol- ding company and swelling …
Budget 2023: Impact on InvITs

Budget 2023: Impact on InvITs

  • Distributions out of repayment of debt principal could now be taxed as ‘other income’ – at odds with global standards
  • Distributions out of debt repayments through redemption of units not treated as ‘income’, but reduce cost of acquisition – InvIT / REIT Regulations do not permit redemption of units…
EduInfra  – Emergence of a new asset class

EduInfra – Emergence of a new asset class

  • EduInfra offers a promising 10 – 11% entry cap rate for annuity investors with rental escalations in the region of 3
    – 5%

  • Infrastructure classification allows for tax optimal exit through InvITs
  • Seller awareness needed – operators slowly moving towards asset light models; depth, but potential…
Listed or Unlisted InvITs – Which way to go?

Listed or Unlisted InvITs – Which way to go?

  • Tracking evolution of InvITs – resurgence and success
  • Debate between private listed and unlisted InvITs – which way to go?
  • Unlisted InvITs remain attractive for investors seeking tax optimal returns and deregulated landscape…

Research Paper

C&I Green Open Access-play: The next big investment destination for infra funds?

C&I Green Open Access-play: The next big investment destination for infra funds?

  • C&I market significantly untapped – accounts for just 6% of the total renewable power purchases
  • Captive open access the most preferred route – i.e. procuring power for captive consumption from private renewable players using govt. transmission facilities.
  • C&I consumer perspective – low investment, significant cost savings,
Smart meters: The basic infrastructure for a green future

Smart meters: The basic infrastructure for a green future

  • Smart meters are essentially a data play – offering unprecedented data that can be used to bring online more green energy, curb electricity loses and reduce costs for consumers
  • The sector has immense depth – USD 30 bn over just the next 2-3 years….
SEBI is slowly re-defining InvITs: What’s at risk for the product and its institutional audience?

SEBI is slowly re-defining InvITs: What’s at risk for the product and its institutional audience?

  • Strong minority unitholder protections introduced – for both public and private InvITs
  • Private InvITs originally designed to attract large institutional capital – light touch re- gulations allowed flexibility to parties to manage their arrangements…
Investing into Infrastructure Holding Companies: What if you become a core investment company?

Investing into Infrastructure Holding Companies: What if you become a core investment company?

  • Infrastructure companies are mandated to execute concessions through SPVs, which often results in qualification of the holding company as a core investment company (CIC)
  • CIC risk is often avoided by structuring EPC and O&M revenues through the hol- ding company and swelling …
InvITs: Gamechanger in the Indian Infrastructure Story!

InvITs: Gamechanger in the Indian Infrastructure Story!

Infrastructure has been the highest capital receiver in 2021, and InvITs continue to be the most favoured investment vehicle for sponsors and global investors alike. InvITs have received >USD 10 billion of investments in the last couple of years, with investments from some of the largest fund houses. The roads regulator of India (NHAI) has also launched its maiden InvIT – with an EV of >USD 1.1bn and participation from large pension funds (CPPIB and OTPP). KKR has again sponsored another InvIT in the renewables space (Virescent Infrastructure) – raising capital from a clutch of investors led by Alberta Investment Management Corporation…

Stakeholder Governance and Stewardship

Analysis

Public M&A: Do List Cos Really Need Omnibus RPT Approvals?

Public M&A: Do List Cos Really Need Omnibus RPT Approvals?

  • There seems to be an overlap between regular RPT approvals and omnibus approval routecreating ambiguity on what type of approvals must be procured for long term related partycontracts?
  • Listed companies often enter into long term contracts with…
SEBI’s Proposed Disclosure Regime: Impact on Public M&A and Directors’ Liabilities

SEBI’s Proposed Disclosure Regime: Impact on Public M&A and Directors’ Liabilities

  • Most proposals are well thought through – unintended impact in a few cases
  • Mandatory clarification of media rumours – M&A dealmaking compromised and potential creation of a false market?…
Unexplored Strategies in the Fortis Saga: Public shareholders and IHH Healthcare exposed to significant collateral damage?

Unexplored Strategies in the Fortis Saga: Public shareholders and IHH Healthcare exposed to significant collateral damage?

  • Latest SC judgement uncovers Daiichi’s new approach – Fortis, IHH and, public shareholders under the gun for liabilities of Fortis’ erstwhile promoters
  • Public shareholders will need to brace for impact and be proactive – else risk getting the short end of the stick
  • Legal sanctity of the ‘theory of attribution’ possibly misplaced in the Fortis context…
Decoding Boardroom Dilemmas (Part III): Can Nominee Directors Share UPSI with Nominating Shareholders?

Decoding Boardroom Dilemmas (Part III): Can Nominee Directors Share UPSI with Nominating Shareholders?

  • No express framework exists for nominee directors to share UPSI with nominating shareholders
  • Natural expectation that nominee directors should represent their nominators’ interests – not permitted under law
  • Since nominee directors’ fiduciary duty remains towards the company and stakeholders, nominee directors are paradoxically placed and exposed to significant…
Decoding Boardroom Dilemmas – Hiving Off to Fundraise Through Subsidiaries – Commercial Wisdom or Short-Changing Public Shareholders?

Decoding Boardroom Dilemmas – Hiving Off to Fundraise Through Subsidiaries – Commercial Wisdom or Short-Changing Public Shareholders?

  • Transferring a majority-revenue generating business into a private subsidiary (hiving off) and raising funds at the subsidiary level is increasingly seen as a preferred alternative to direct listed acquisitions or slump sales
  • Hiving off may result in a ‘holding company discount’ and public shareholders lose out on value…
Threat of valuation litigation in Public M&A – Carlyle-PNB Effect! 

Threat of valuation litigation in Public M&A – Carlyle-PNB Effect! 

  • SEBI floor price prescription in case of fund raises should not automatically dislodge directors’ duty to exercise independent judgment and maximise shareholder value
  • Target boards to proactively consider appointing an independent banker and running a robust auction process for capital raises…

Research Paper

Public M&A: Do List Cos Really Need Omnibus RPT Approvals?

Public M&A: Do List Cos Really Need Omnibus RPT Approvals?

  • There seems to be an overlap between regular RPT approvals and omnibus approval routecreating ambiguity on what type of approvals must be procured for long term related partycontracts?
  • Listed companies often enter into long term contracts with…
Should Offshore Funds Appoint Directors?

Should Offshore Funds Appoint Directors?

The issue of director duties and attendant liabilities has been a subject of immense debate as the role of directors evolves in the Indian context. India is perhaps a decade behind the west in this evolution process, though rapidly catching up driven by increasingly proactive proxy advisory firms and institutional capital taking significant positions in Indian companies, though activist funds are still a rarity. Transcendence from ‘complying with their obligations’ to ‘performing their duties’ has probably been most transformational and manifested only in the past couple of years…

Tax Structuring & Litigation

Analysis

Ambiguity with thin cap norms: Private credit players risk significant tax leakage

Ambiguity with thin cap norms: Private credit players risk significant tax leakage

  • Accurate reading of thin capitalization norms is highly relevant to maximize IRRs, especially in asset heavy sectors
  • Currently, norms interpreted such that sometimes the entire interest paid to foreign related parties is disallowed for the target (as expense)…
Private Credit: Interest on NCDs recharacterized as dividends 

Private Credit: Interest on NCDs recharacterized as dividends 

  • Tax authorities recharacterized interest income on NCDs as dividends
  • Interest recharacterization has not taken place under GAAR
  • Investors can prevent such mischaracterization by demonstrating the nature of the underlying instrument, periodicity of payments, maturity date, management rights,
    etc….
Denial of tax treaty benefits: Blueprinting defence strategies for PE funds – A tax litigation perspective

Denial of tax treaty benefits: Blueprinting defence strategies for PE funds – A tax litigation perspective

  • Revenue has issued reassessment orders to several global PE/VC funds denying
    tax treaty benefits to grandfathered investments alleging treaty shopping through Mauritius and Singapore between AY 2013-14 and 2015-16

  • Substantial tax, interest, and penalty has been levied invoking judicial anti-avoidance principles based on a supposed lack of commercial substance in these jurisdictions…
Top 5 Tax Considerations When Structuring Debt Investments in India

Top 5 Tax Considerations When Structuring Debt Investments in India

  • Recent developments in the Indian tax regime have brought India closer to global
    norms though hybrid instruments that have come under increased scrutiny

  • GAAR provisions have enabled tax authorities to examine the commercial substance of transactions, underscoring the importance of purpose, pooling, and people…

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